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Abstract. Motivated by the security of the nonlinear lter generator, the
concept of correlation was previously extended to the conditional correla-
tion, that studied the linear correlation of the inputs conditioned on a given
(short) output pattern of some specic nonlinear function. Based on the con-
ditional correlations, conditional correlation attacks were shown to be suc-
cessful and ecient against the nonlinear lter generator. In this paper, we
further generalize the concept of conditional correlations by assigning it with
a dierent meaning, i.e. the correlation of the output of an arbitrary function
conditioned on the unknown (partial) input which is uniformly distributed.
Based on this generalized conditional correlation, a general statistical model
is studied for dedicated key-recovery distinguishers. It is shown that the
generalized conditional correlation is no smaller than the unconditional cor-
relation. Consequently, our distinguisher improves on the traditional one
(in the worst case it degrades into the traditional one). In particular, the
distinguisher may be successful even if no ordinary correlation exists. As
an application, a conditional correlation attack is developed and optimized
against Bluetooth two-level E0. The attack is based on a recently detected
aw in the resynchronization of E0, as well as the investigation of conditional
correlations in the Finite State Machine (FSM) governing the keystream out-
put of E0. Our best attack nds the original encryption key for two-level E0
using the rst 24 bits of 2
23:8 frames and with 2
38 computations. This is
clearly the fastest and only practical known-plaintext attack on Bluetooth
encryption compared with all existing attacks. Current experiments conrm
our analysis.
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1 Introduction
In stream ciphers, correlation properties play a vital role in correlation attacks (to
name a few, see [7{9,15,18,19,26,27,30]). For LFSR-based3 keystream generators,
such as the nonlinear lter generator or the combiner, correlation commonly means
a statistically biased relation between the produced keystream and the output of
certain LFSR sequences. In [1,21,22], the concept of (ordinary) correlations was
further extended to the conditional correlation to describe the linear correlation of
the inputs conditioned on a given (short) output pattern of a nonlinear function
(with small input size). Based on conditional correlations, the conditional correla-
tion attack received successful studies towards the nonlinear lter generator in [1,21,
22]. In this paper, we assign a dierent meaning to conditional correlations, i.e. the
correlation of the output of an arbitrary function (with favorable small input size)
conditioned on the unknown (partial) input which is uniformly distributed. This
might be viewed as the generalized opposite of [1,21,22]. As a useful application of
3 LFSR refers to Linear Feedback Shift Register, see [28] for more.our conditional correlations, imagine the attacker not only observes the keystream,
but also has access to an intermediate computation process controlled partly by the
key, which outputs a hopefully biased sequence for the right key and (presumably)
unbiased sequences for wrong keys. If such side information is available, the con-
ditional correlation attack may become feasible, which exploits correlations of the
intermediate computation output conditioned on (part of) the inputs. In general, as
informally conjectured in [22], conditional correlations are dierent and often larger
than ordinary (unconditional) correlations, which eects reduced data complexity
of conditional correlation attacks over ordinary correlation attacks.
Our rst contribution consists of extracting a precise and general statistical
model for dedicated key-recoverydistinguishers based on the generalized conditional
correlations. This framework deals with a specic kind of smart distinguishers that
exploit correlations conditioned on the (partial) input, which is not restricted to
keystream generators and is also applicable to other scenarios (e.g. side channel
attacks like fault attacks in [4]). As the ordinary correlation serves as the criterion
for the data complexity of the traditional distinguisher (that only exploits ordinary
correlations), our result based on the sound theory of traditional distinguisher [5]
tells that the conditional correlation serves similarly as the criterion for the data
complexity of the smart distinguisher. The construction of the smart distinguisher
also solves the unaddressed problem in [1,21,22] on how to make the best use of
all the collected data, which can be transformed in the context of [1,21,22]. We
prove that the smart distinguisher improves on the traditional one (in the worst
case the smart distinguisher degrades into the traditional one), because our gener-
alized conditional correlation is no smaller than the unconditional correlation. In
particular, the smart distinguisher can still work eciently even though the tradi-
tional one fails thoroughly. Meanwhile, we also study the computational complexity
of the deterministic smart distinguisher for a special case, in which the essence of
the major operation done by the distinguisher is identied to be nothing but the
regular convolution. Thanks to Fast Walsh Transform4 (FWT), when the key size is
not too large, the smart distinguisher is able to achieve the optimal complete infor-
mation set decoding and becomes a very powerful computing machine. Nonetheless,
in general, with a very large key size, it is unrealistic to use the deterministic dis-
tinguisher as complete information set decoding is impractical; many other ecient
decoding techniques (e.g. the probabilistic iterative decoding) such as introduced in
the previous conditional correlation attacks [22] or the correlation attacks will also
apply to our smart distinguisher.
As a second contribution, we apply our smart distinguisher to a conditional cor-
relation attack5 on two-level E0, the keystream generator that is used in the short-
range wireless technology Bluetooth [6]. The attack exploits the resynchronization
aw recently detected in [24]. Whereas in [24], this aw is used for a traditional dis-
tinguisher based on results [12,16,17,23] of ordinary correlations, our conditional
correlation attack relies on the systematic investigation of correlations conditioned
on the inputs to the FSM in E0. These correlations extend a specic conditional
correlation found in [23], which relates to one of the largest known biases in E0 as
proved in [23]. The time complexity of our attack is optimized as the smart dis-
tinguisher works particularly well in this favorable case. Our best attack recovers
the original encryption key for two-level E0 using the rst 24 bits of 223:8 frames
after 238 computations. Note that the number of necessary frames is below the
maximum number 226 of resynchronizations with the same user key as specied by
4 Note that most recently FWT was successfully applied in [9,23] to optimize dierent
problems in correlation attacks.
5 For the conditional correlation attack related to the previous work [1,21,22] on Blue-
tooth E0, see [16].Bluetooth [6]. Compared with all existing attacks [13,14,16,20,24,29] on two-level
E0, our attack is clearly the fastest and only practical resynchronization attack6 so
far. Note that the resynchronization attacks on one-level E0 were well studied in [3,
14,24] to be much more ecient.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some
notations and give preliminaries. In Section 3, based on the generalized conditional
correlation, the practical statistical model on smart distinguishers with side informa-
tion is formalized and analyzed. In Section 4 we review the description of Bluetooth
two-level E0 as well as the resynchronization aw. In Section 5, correlations condi-
tioned on input weights of E0 FSM are investigated. In Section 6, a key-recovery
attack on two-level E0 is developed and optimized together with experimental re-
sults. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
2 Notations and Preliminaries
Given the function f : E ! GF(2)`, dene the distribution Df of f(X) with X
uniformly distributed, i.e. Df(a) = 1
jEj
P
X2E 1f(X)=a for all a 2 GF(2)`. Follow-
ing [5], recall that the Squared Euclidean Imbalance (SEI) of the distribution Df is
dened by
(Df) = 2` X
a2GF(2)`

Df (a)  
1
2`
2
: (1)
For ` = 1, it's easy to see that (Df) is closely related to the well known term
correlation7 (Df) by (Df) = 2(Df). For brevity, we adopt the simplied nota-
tions (f);(f) to denote (Df);(Df) respectively hereafter. From the theory of
hypothesis testing and Neyman-Pearson likelihood ratio (see [5]), (f) tells us that
the minimum number n of samples for an optimal distinguisher to eectively dis-
tinguish a sequence of n output samples of f from (2L  1) truly random sequences
of equal length is
n =
4Llog2
(f)
: (2)
Note that the result in Eq.(2) with ` = 1 has long been known up to a constant
factor 1
2 in the theory of channel coding. In fact, correlation attacks has been very
successful for almost two decades to apply the distinguisher that analyzes the biased
sample of a single bit (i.e. the case ` = 1) in order to reconstruct the L-bit key (or
subkey), where only the right key can produce a biased sequence while all the wrong
keys produce unbiased sequences. More recently, on the sound theoretical basis [5] of
the generalized distinguisher, it was shown that this generalized distinguisher helps
to improve the correlation attack when considering multi-biases simultaneously (for
details see the key-recovery attack [23] on one-level E0 which halves the time and
data complexities).
3 A Smart Distinguisher with Side Information
Given a function f : GF(2)u  GF(2)v ! GF(2)r, let fB(X) = f(B;X) for B 2
GF(2)u and X 2 GF(2)v, where the notation fB() is used to replace f() whenever
B is given. Consider such a game between a player and an oracle. Each time the
6 A resynchronization attack on stream cipher (a.k.a. the related-key attack) refers to the
one that needs many frames of keystreams produced by dierent IVs (i.e. the public
frame counter) and the same key in order to recover the key given the IVs.
7 Correlation is commonly dened by Df(1) =
1
2 +
(Df)
2 ; and j(Df)j  1 by this deni-
tion.oracle secretly generates B;X independently and uniformly to compute fB(X); the
player, in turn, sends a guess on the current value of the partial input B. Only
when he guesses correctly, the oracle would output the value of fB(X), otherwise,
it would output a random and uniformly distributed Z 2 GF(2)r. Suppose the
player somehow manages to collect 2L sequences of n interaction samples with the
following characteristics: one sequence has n samples (fBK
i (Xi);BK
i ) (i = 1;:::;n)
where BK
i 's and Xi's are independently and uniformly distributed; the remaining
(2L 1) sequences all consist of n independently and uniformly distributed random
variables (ZK
i ;BK
i ) (i = 1;:::;n) for K 6= K. One interesting question to the
player is how to distinguish the biased sequence from the other sequences using the
minimum number n of samples.
Note that the above problem is of special interest in key-recovery attacks, includ-
ing the related-key attacks, where BK
i 's are the key-related material (i.e. computable
with the key and other random public parameters) and the oracle can be viewed as
an intermediate computation process accessible to the attacker with only a limited
number of queries. Thus, when the attacker knows the right key K he can collect
n (hopefully biased) samples of f; on the other hand, if he uses the wrong key, he
will only collect an unbiased sequence.
From Section 2, we know that the minimum number n of samples for the basic
distinguisher which doesn't use the partial input Bi's is n = 4Llog2=(f). When
the samples are incorporated with the Bi's, we can prove the following stronger
result.
Theorem 1. The smart distinguisher (in Algorithm 1) solves our above problem
with
n =
4Llog2
E[(fB)]
(3)
and the time complexity O(n  2L), where the expectation is taken over all the uni-
formly distributed B. Moreover, the distinguisher can achieve the optimal time com-
plexity O(n +L 2L+1) with precomputation O(L 2L) when BK
i 's and ZK
i 's can be
expressed by:
BK
i = L(K)  ci ; (4)
Z
K
i = L
0(K)  c
0
i  g(B
K
i ); (5)
for all L-bit K and i = 1;2;:::;n, where g is an arbitrary function, L;L0 are
GF(2)-linear functions, and ci's, c0
i's are independently and uniformly distributed
which are known to the distinguisher.
Remark 2. Our smart distinguisher (Algorithm 1) turns out to be a derivative of the
basic distinguisher in [5] and the result Eq.(3) for the simple case r = 1 was already
pointed out (without proof) in [16] with a mere dierence of a negligible constant
term 2log2  20:47. Also note that the quantity E[(fB)] in Eq.(3) measures the
correlation of the output of an arbitrary function conditioned on the (partial) input
which is uniformly distributed and unknown8. In contrast, prior to our work, the
conditional correlation, that refers to the linear correlation of the inputs conditioned
on a given (short) output pattern of a nonlinear function, was well studied in [1,
21,22] based on a dierent statistical distance other than SEI. Highly motivated
by the security of the nonlinear lter generator, their research focused on the case
where the nonlinear function is the augmented nonlinear lter function (with small
input size) and the inputs are the involved LFSR taps. Obviously, the notion of our
8 According to the rule of our game, it's unknown to the distinguisher whether the sample
B is the correct value used for the oracle to compute fB(X) or not.Algorithm 1 The smart distinguisher with side information
Parameters:
1: n set by Eq.(3)
2: DfB for all B 2 GF(2)
u
Inputs:
3: uniformly and independently distributed u-bit B
K
1 ;:::;B
K
n for all L-bit K
4: Z
K
1 ;:::;Z
K
n = fBK
1 (X1);:::;fBK
n (Xn) for one xed L-bit K with uniformly and inde-
pendently distributed v-bit vectors X1;:::;Xn
5: uniformly and independently distributed sequences Z
K
1 ;Z
K
2 ;:::;Z
K
n for all L-bit K
such that K 6= K
Goal: nd K
Processing:
6: for all L-bit K do
7: G(K)   0
8: for i = 1;:::;n do
9: G(K)   G(K) + log2

2
r  Df
BK
i
(Z
K
i )

10: end for
11: end for
12: output K that maximizes G(K)
conditional correlation can be seen as the generalized opposite of [1,21,22], that
addresses the issue of how to make the most use of all the data for the success.
In Section 6, Theorem 1 is directly applied to Bluetooth two-level E0 for a truly
practical attack.
Proof (sketch). Let us introduce a new distribution D over GF(2)r+u from DfB
dened by
D(B;Z) =
1
2uDfB(Z); (6)
for all B 2 GF(2)u;Z 2 GF(2)r. We can see that our original problem is trans-
formed into that of the basic distinguisher to distinguish D from uniform distribu-
tion. According to Section 2, we need minimum n = 4Llog2=(D). So we compute
(D) by Eq.(1,6):
(D) = 2r+u X
B2GF(2)u
X
Z2GF(2)r

D(B;Z)  
1
2r+u
2
= 2
r+u X
B2GF(2)u
X
Z2GF(2)r

1
2uDfB(Z)  
1
2r+u
2
= 2 u X
B2GF(2)u
2r X
Z2GF(2)r

DfB(Z)  
1
2r
2
= E[(fB)]: (7)
Meanwhile, the best distinguisher tries to maximize the probability
Qn
i=1 D(Bi;Zi),
i.e. the conditioned probability
Qn
i=1 DfBi(Zi). As the conventional approach, we
know that this is equivalent to maximize G =
Pn
i=1 log2(2r DfBi(Zi)) as shown in
Algorithm 1. The time complexity of the distinguisher9 is obviously O(n  2L).
9 In this paper, we only discuss the deterministic distinguisher. For the probabilistic distin-
guisher, many ecient and general decoding techniques (e.g. the probabilistic iterative
decoding), which are successful in correlation attacks, were carefully presented in the
related work [22] and such techniques also apply to our distinguisher.Now, to show how to optimize the time complexity of the smart distinguisher
when BK
i 's and ZK
i 's exhibit the special structure of Eq.(4, 5) for the second part
of the theorem, let us rst introduce two functions H;H0:
H(K) =
n X
i=1
1L(K)=ci and L0(K)=c0
i (8)
H
0(K) = log2
 
2
r  DfL(K) (L
0(K)  g (L(K)))

(9)
for K 2 GF(2)L. We can see that G(K) computed in Line 7 to 10, Algorithm 1 is
nothing but a simple convolution (denoted by 
) between H and H0:
G(K) = (H 
 H0)(K)
def =
X
K02GF(2)L
H(K0)H0(K  K0); (10)
for all K 2 GF(2)L. It's known that convolution and Walsh transform (denoted by
the hat symbol) are transformable, so we have
G(K) =
1
2L
\ \ H 
 H0 (K) =
1
2L
c H00(K); (11)
where H00(K) = b H(K)c H0(K). This means that after computing H and H0, the time
complexity of our smart distinguisher would be dominated by three times of FWT,
i.e. b H; c H0; c H00 in O(3L2L). Moreover, since only ci's, c0
i's may vary from one run of
the attack to another, which are independent of H0, we can also precompute c H0 and
store it in the table; nally, the real-time processing only takes time O(n+L2L+1).

Property 3. We have
E[(fB)]  (f);
where equality holds if and only if (i) DfB is independent of B.
For r = 1, this can be easily shown as follows. From Section 2, we have E[(fB)] =
E[2(fB)]  E2[(fB)] = 2(f) = (f) where equality holds i (fB) is independent
of B. In Appendix, we give the complete proof for the general case E[(fB)]  (f).
Remark 4. As E[(fB)];(f) measures the conditional correlation and the uncon-
ditional correlation respectively, this property convinces us that the former is no
smaller than the latter. This relationship between the conditional correlation and
the unconditional correlation was informally conjectured in [22]. We conclude from
Eq.(3) that the smart distinguisher having partial (or side) information (i.e. B
herein) about the biased source generator (i.e. fB herein) always works better than
the basic distinguisher governing no knowledge of that side information, as long as
the generator is statistically dependent on the side information. Our result veries
the intuition that the more the distinguisher knows about the generation of the
biased source, the better it works. In particular, Property 3 implies that even if
the fact that (f) = 0 causes the basic distinguisher to be completely useless as it
needs innite data complexity, in contrast, the smart distinguisher would still work
as long as DfB is dependent on B, i.e. E[(fB)] > 0. In Section 5, we give two
illustrative examples E[(fB)] on the core of Bluetooth E0 to be compared with
their counterparts (f).
4 Review on Bluetooth Two-level E0
The core (Fig. 1) of Bluetooth keystream generator E0 (also called one-level E0)
consists of four regularly-clocked LFSRs of a total 128 bits and a Finite StateFSM
LSB
c
0
t
LFSR4
LFSR3
LFSR2
LFSR1
st

Fig.1. The core of Bluetooth keystream generator E0
Machine (FSM) of 4 bits. Denote Bt 2 GF(2)4 the four output bits of LFSRs at
time instance t, and Xt 2 GF(2)4 the FSM state at time instance t. Note that Xt
contains the bit c0
t as well as the bit c0
t 1 (due to the eect of a delay cell inside the
FSM). Also note that the computation of the FSM next state Xt+1 only depends on
its current state Xt together with the Hamming weight w(Bt) of Bt. At each time
instance t, the core produces one bit st = (w(Bt) mod 2)  c0
t, and then updates
the states of LFSRs and FSM.
According to the Bluetooth standard [6], this core is used with a two-level ini-
tialization scheme to produce the keystream for encryption. That is, after a rst
initialization of LFSRs by an ane transformation of the eective encryption key
K and the public nonce10 Pi for the i-th frame, E0 runs at level one, whose last 128
output bits are permuted into LFSRs at level two for reinitialization; then E0 runs
at level two to produce the nal keystream zi
t0 for t0 = 1;2;:::;2745 (for clarity,
we refer the time instance t and t0 to the context of E0 level one and E0 level two
respectively).
In order to review the reinitialization aw discovered in [24], we rst introduce
some notations. Dene the binary vector  = (0;1;:::;` 1) of length jj = `  3
with 0 = ` 1 = 1 and let   = (` 1;` 2;:::;0) represent the vector in reverse
order of . Given ` and t, for the one-level E0, we dene Bt+1 = Bt+1Bt+2 :::Bt+` 2
and Ct = (c0
t;:::;c0
t+` 1). Then, the function h

Bt+1 : Xt+1 7! Ct is well dened11
for all t, where the dot operator between two vectors represents the inner GF(2)-
product. Now, we let (Bi
t+1;Xi
t+1) (resp. (Bi
t0+1;Xi
t0+1)) control the FSM to compute
Ci
t (resp. Ci
t0) at E0 rst (resp. second) level for the i-th frame. Note that initializa-
tion of LFSRs at E0 level one by an ane transformation of K;Pi can be expressed
by
B
i
t = Gt(K)  G
0
t(P
i); (12)
where Gt;G0
t are public linear functions (which are dependent on ` but omitted from
notations for simplicity). Moreover, we let Zi
t0 = (zi
t0;:::;zi
t0+` 1). Then, as pointed
out and detailed in [24], the critical reinitialization aw of Bluetooth two-level E0
can be expressed as
   (Zi
t0  Lt0(K)  L0
t0(Pi)) =
4 M
j=1
(  Ci
tj)  (   Ci
t0); (13)
10 P
i includes a 26-bit counter and some user-dependent constant.
11 because c
0
t;c
0
t+1 are contained in Xt+1 already and we can compute c
0
t+2;:::;c
0
t+` 1 by
Bt+1;Xt+1. Actually, the prerequisite 0 = ` 1 = 1 on  is to guarantee that knowledge
of Bt+1;Xt+1 is necessary and sucient to compute   Ct.for any i and  of length ` such that 3  `  8, and t0 2
S2
k=0f8k+1;:::;8k+9 `g,
where t1;:::;t4 are functions12 in terms of t0 only, and Ci
t1;:::;Ci
t4 share no common
coordinate, and Lt0;L0
t0 are xed linear functions which can be expressed by t0;`
from the standard. By denition of h, Eq.(13) can be put equivalently as:
   (Zi
t0  Lt0(K)  L0
t0(Pi)) =
4 M
j=1
h

Bi
tj+1
(Xi
tj+1)  h
 
Bi
t0+1
(Xi
t0+1); (14)
for any i, any  with 3  `  8 and t0 2
S2
k=0f8k + 1;:::;8k + 9   `g. Note that
the usage of the bar operator actually reects the fact that the loading of LFSRs
at E0 level two for reinitialization is in reverse order of the keystream output at E0
level one.
5 Correlations Conditioned on Input Weights of FSM
Recall it has been observed in [23] that if w(Bt)w(Bt+1)w(Bt+2)w(Bt+3) = 2222 is
satised, then, we always have
c0
t  c0
t+1  c0
t+2  c0
t+3  c0
t+4 = 1: (15)
Let t =   Ct with  = (1;1;1;1;1) and ` = 5. Thus t is the sum on the left-
hand side of Eq.(15). From Section 4 we know that given Bt+1 = Bt+1Bt+2Bt+3 2
GF(2)12, the function h

Bt+1 : Xt+1 7! t is well dened for all t. Let W(Bt+1)
def =
w(Bt+1)w(Bt+2)w(Bt+` 2). Thereby, we deduct from [23] that t = 1 whenever
W(Bt+1) = 222. In contrast to the (unconditional) correlation as mentioned in
Section 2, we call it a conditional correlation13, i.e. the correlation (h

Bt+1) = 1
conditioned on W(Bt+1) = 222.
This motivates us to study the general correlation (h

Bt+1) conditioned on Bt+1,
or more precisely W(Bt+1), when Xt+1 is uniformly distributed. All the non-zero
conditional correlations (h

Bt+1) are shown in Table 1 in descending order of the
absolute value, where jBt+1j denotes the cardinality of Bt+1 admitting any weight
triplet in the group. As the unconditioned correlation (h) of the bit t always
equals the mean value14 E[(h

Bt+1)] over the uniformly distributed Bt+1, we can
use Table 1 to verify (h) = 25
256 (denote this value15 by ). Let fB = h

Bt+1 with
 = (1;1;1;1;1). Now, to verify Property 3 in Section 3 we compute E[(fB)] =
544
212  2 2:9, which is signicantly larger than (f) = 2  2 6:67. As another
example, consider now fB = h

Bt+1 with  = (1;1;0;1) and u = 8;v = 4;r = 1.
Similarly, the conditioned correlation of the corresponding sum c0
t  c0
t+1  c0
t+3
(denoted by 0
t) is shown in Table 2. From Table 2, we get a quite large E[(fB)] =
12 additionally, given t
0, the relation t1 < t2 < t3 < t4 always holds that satises t2   t1 =
t4   t3 = 8 and t3   t2  32.
13 Note that earlier in [16], correlations conditioned on keystream bits (both with and
without one LFSR outputs) were well studied for one-level E0, which dier from our
conditional correlations and do not t in the context of two-level E0 if the initial state
of E0 is not recovered level by level.
14 Note that E[(h

Bt+1)] is computed by an exhaustive search over all possible Xt+1 2
GF(2)
4, Bt+1 2 GF(2)
12 and thus does not depend on t.
15 this unconditional correlation was discovered by [12, 16] and proved later on by [23] to
be one of the two largest unconditioned correlations up to 26-bit output sequence of the
FSM.2 3 as well; in contrast, we can check that as already pointed out in Section 3, the
unconditional correlation16 (f) = 0 from Table 2.
Table 1. Weight triplets to generate the biased bit t with  = (1;1;1;1;1) and ` = 5
bias of t weight triplet(s) cardinality
(h

Bt+1) W(Bt+1) jBt+1j
-1 220, 224 72
1 222 216
-0.5 120, 124, 210, 214 192
230, 234, 320, 324
0.5 122, 212, 322, 232 576
110, 111, 114, 130
-0.25 131, 134, 310, 311 384
314, 330, 331, 334
0.25 112, 113, 132, 133 640
312, 313, 332, 333
Table 2. Weight pairs to generate the biased bit 
0
t with  = (1;1;0;1) and ` = 4
bias of 
0
t weight pairs cardinality
(h

Bt+1) W(Bt+1) jBt+1j
-1 01, 43 8
1 03, 41 8
-0.5 11, 33 32
0.5 13, 31 32
6 Key-recovery Attack on Bluetooth Two-level E0
6.1 Basic Idea
Given the binary vector  (to be determined later) with 3  `  8, for all B 2
GF(2)4(` 2) such that (h

B) 6= 0, dene the function
g(B) =

1; if (h

B) > 0
0; if (h

B) < 0
to estimate the eective value of h

B(X) (dened in Section 4) for some unknown
X 2 GF(2)4. For a xed t0 2
S2
k=0f8k + 1;:::;8k + 9   jjg, let us guess the
subkey K1
def = (Gt1(K);:::;Gt4(K)) of 16(`   2) bits by c K1 and the one-bit subkey
K2
def =    Lt0(K) by c K2. We set K = (K1;K2), b K = (c K1; c K2). As Pi's are public,
for every frame i, we can use Eq.(12) to compute the estimate \ Bi
tj+1 for Bi
tj+1 for
16 Note that on the other hand the unconditional correlation (h
) = 2
 4 with  =
(1;0;1;1) (denote this value by 
0), shown rst in [17], was proved by [23] to be the only
second largest unconditioned correlations up to 26-bit output sequence of the FSM.j = 1;:::;4 with c K1. Denote
Bi = (Bi
t1+1;Bi
t2+1;Bi
t3+1;Bi
t4+1);
X i = (Xi
t1+1;Xi
t2+1;Xi
t3+1;Xi
t4+1;Xi
t0+1;Bi
t0+1; b K):
Dene the probabilistic mapping F

Bi(X i) to be a truly random bit with uniform
distribution for all i such that
Q4
j=1 (h

\ Bi
tj+1
) = 0; otherwise, we let
F

Bi(X i) =
4 M
j=1

h

Bi
tj+1
(Xi
tj+1)  g(\ Bi
tj+1)

 h (Bi
t0+1;Xi
t0+1): (16)
Note that given c K2, F

Bi(X i) is accessible in the latter case as we have
F

Bi(X i) =   
 
Zi
t0  L0
t0(Pi)

 c K2 
4 M
j=1
g(\ Bi
tj+1);
for all i such that
Q4
j=1 (h

\ Bi
tj+1
) 6= 0 according to Eq.(14). With the correct guess
b K = K, Eq.(16) reduces to
F

Bi(X i) =
4 M
j=1

h

Bi
tj+1
(Xi
tj+1)  g(Bi
tj+1)

 h (Bi
t0+1;Xi
t0+1); (17)
for all i such that
Q4
j=1 (h

Bi
tj+1
) 6= 0. As the right-hand side of Eq.(17) only involves
the unknown Xi = (Xi
t1+1;Xi
t2+1;Xi
t3+1;Xi
t4+1;Xi
t0+1;Bi
t0+1), we denote the map-
ping in this case by f

Bi(Xi). With appropriate choice of  as discussed in the next
subsection, we can have E[(f

Bi)] > 0. With each wrong guess b K 6= K, however,
as shown in Appendix, we estimate F

Bi(X i) to be uniformly and independently
distributed for all i (i.e. E[(F

Bi)] = 0).
As we are interested in small ` for low time complexity, e.g. j`j < 6 as explained
immediately next, we can assume from this constraint17 that Xi's are uniformly
distributed and that all Xi's, Bi's are independent. Submitting 2L sequences of n
pairs (F

Bi(X i);c Bi) (for i = 1;2;:::;n) to the distinguisher, we can t in the smart
distinguisher of Section 3 with L = 16(` 2)+1;u = 16(` 2);v = 20+4(` 2);r = 1
and expect it to successfully recover L-bit K with data complexity n suciently
large as analyzed later. Note that the favourable L < 64 necessitates that ` < 6.
6.2 Complexity Analysis and Optimization
From Eq.(3) in Section 3, the smart distinguisher needs data complexity
n =
4Llog2
E


 
f

Bi
: (18)
To compute n, we introduce another probabilistic mapping f
0
Bi similar to f

Bi:
f
0
Bi(X i)
def =
4 M
j=1
h

Bi
tj+1
(Xi
tj+1)  h (Bi
t0+1;Xi
t0+1): (19)
17 however, the assumption does not hold for ` = 7;8: with ` = 8, we know that X
i
t2+1
is xed given X
i
t1+1 and B
i
t1+1 as we have t2 = t1 + 8 from Section 4; with ` = 7,
two bits of X
i
t2+1 are xed given X
i
t1+1 and B
i
t1+1. Similar statements hold concerning
X
i
t3+1;B
i
t3+1 and X
i
t4+1.Theorem 5. For all Bi = (Bi
t1+1;Bi
t2+1;Bi
t3+1;Bi
t4+1) 2 GF(2)16(` 2), we always
have
(f

Bi) = (f
0
Bi):
Proof. This is trivial for the case where
Q4
j=1 (h

Bi
tj+1
) = 0, because by deni-
tion Df

Bi is a uniform distribution and so is D
f
0
Bi
by the famous Piling-up lemma
(see [25]). Let us discuss the case where
Q4
j=1 (h

Bi
tj+1
) 6= 0. In this case we know
that given Bi,
L4
j=1 g(Bi
tj+1) is well-dened and it is a xed value that doesn't
depend on the unknown Xi. Consequently, we have (f

Bi) = (f
0
Bi  const.) =
(f
0
Bi). 
We can use Theorem 5 to compute
4Llog 2
n from Eq.(18) as
4Llog 2
n = E[(f

Bi)] =
E[(f
0
Bi)]. Next, the independence of Bi's allows us to apply Piling-up Lemma [25]
to continue as follows,
4Llog2
n
= E
2
4(h
 )
4 Y
j=1


h

Bi
tj+1

3
5 = (h
 )
4 Y
j=1
E



h

Bi
tj+1

:
Because we know from Section 5 that E[(h

Bi
t+1
)] does not depend on t and i, we
nally have
4Llog2
n
= (h )  E
4
h


h

Bt+1
i
: (20)
As we want to minimize n, according to Eq.(18), we would like to nd some 
(3  jj < 6) such that E[(f

Bi)] is large, and above all, strictly positive. In
order to have E[(f

Bi)] > 0, we must have (h ) > 0 rst, by Eq.(20). According
to results of [16,17,12,23], only two aforementioned choices satisfy our predened
prerequisite about  (i.e. both the rst and last coordinates of  are one): either  =
(1;1;1;1;1) with (h ) = 2  2 6:71, or  = (1;1;0;1) with (h ) = 02 = 2 8.
For  = (1;1;1;1;1), from last section, we know that E[(h

Bt+1)]  2 2:9. So we
conclude from Eq.(20) that n  225:4 frames of keystreams generated by the same
key K suce to recover the L = 49-bit subkey K. Analogously, for  = (1;1;0;1),
we have E[(h

Bt+1)] = 2 3 from last section. And it results in n  226:5 frames to
recover L = 33-bit subkey.
Let us discuss the time complexity of the attack now. For all J = (J1;J2) 2
GF(2)L 1  GF(2), and let J1 = (J1;1;:::;J1;4) where J1;i 2 GF(2)4(` 2), we
dene H;H0:
H(J) =
Pn
i=1 1G0
t1(Pi);:::;G0
t4(Pi)=J1 and  (Zi
t0L0
t0(Pi))=J2;
H0(J) =
(
0; if
Q4
i=1 (h

J1;i) = 0
log2r  DJ1

J2 
L4
i=1 g (J1;i)

; otherwise
where DJ1 = Dh

J1;1 
 Dh

J1;2 
 Dh

J1;3 
 Dh

J1;4. Let H00(K) = b H(K)  c H0(K). By
Theorem 1 in Section 3, we have G(K) = 1
2L c H00(K). This means that after precom-
puting c H0 in time O(L  2L), our partial key-recovery attack would be dominated
by twice FWT, i.e. b H; c H00 with time O(L 2L+1). Algorithm 2 illustrates the above
basic partial key-recovery attack. Note that without the optimization technique of
Theorem 1, the deterministic smart distinguisher has to perform O(n2L) operations
otherwise, which makes our attack impractical.Algorithm 2 The basic partial key-recovery attack on two-level E0
Parameters:
1: ;t
0;t1;t2;t3;t4;L
2: n set by Eq.(20)
Inputs:
3: P
i for i = 1;2;:::;n
4: Z
i
t0 for i = 1;2;:::;n
Preprocessing:
5: compute H
0; c H0
Processing:
6: compute H; b H
7: compute H
00 = b H  c H0 and c H00
8: output K with the maximum c H00(K)
Furthermore, by Table 2, we discovered a special property
(h

Bt+1Bt+2)  (h

Bt+1Bt+2)   (h

Bt+1Bt+2)   (h

Bt+1Bt+2) (21)
for all Bt+1 = Bt+1Bt+2 2 GF(2)8 with  = (1;1;0;1), where the bar operator
denotes the bitwise complement of the 4-bit binary vector. This means that for
our 33-bit partial key-recovery attack, we always have 44 = 256 equivalent key
candidates18 (see Appendix for details), which helps to decrease the computation
time on c H00 (see [23]) from 33  233  238 to 25  225  230. In total we have the
running time 238 + 230  238 for Algorithm 2.
We have implemented the full Algorithm 2 with  = (1;1;0;1);t0 = 1;n = 226
frames (slightly less than the theoretical estimate 226:5) on the Linux platform,
2.4G CPU, 2G RAM, 128GB hard disk. It turned out that after one run of a 37-
hour precomputation (i.e. Line 5 in Algorithm 2 which stores a 64GB table in the
hard disk), of all the 30 runs tested so far, our attack never fails to successfully
recover the right 25-bit key in about 19 hours. Computing H; b H;H00; c H00 takes time
27 minutes, 18 hours, 45 minutes and 20 seconds respectively. The running time
is dominated by FWT19 b H, which only takes a negligible portion of CPU time
and depends dominantly on the performance of the hardware, i.e. the external data
transfer rate20 between the hard disk and PC's main memory.
Inspired by the multi-bias analysis on the traditional distinguisher in [23], the
advanced multi-bias analysis (see Appendix) which is an extension of this section
allows us to reach the data complexity n  223:8 frames with the same time com-
plexity. Once we recover the rst (33   8) = 25-bit subkey, we just increment (or
decrement) t0 by one and use the knowledge of those subkey bits to reiterate Algo-
rithm 2 to recover more key bits similarly as was done in [24]. Since only 17 new
key bits are involved, which reduce to the 13-bit equivalent key, it's much faster
to recover those key bits. Finally, we perform an exhaustive search over the equiv-
alent key candidates in negligible time, whose total number is upper bounded by
2
8jKj
32 = 2
jKj
4 . The nal complexity of the complete key-recovery attack is bounded
by one run of Algorithm 2, i.e. O(238). Table 3 compares our attacks with the best
known attacks [13,14,16,24] on two-level E0 for eective key size jKj = 128. Note
that with jKj = 64, Bluetooth key loading at E0 level one makes the bits of the
subkey K linearly independent for all t0 2
S2
k=0f8k +1;:::;8k+5g. Therefore, the
attack complexities remain to be on the same order.
18 The term \equivalent key candidate" is exclusively used for our attack, which doesn't
mean that they are equivalent keys for the Bluetooth encryption.
19 The result is stored in a 32GB table in the hard disk.
20 In our PC it is 32MB/s, which is common in the normal PC nowadays.Table 3. Comparison of our attacks with the best attacks on two-level E0 for jKj = 128
Attack Precomputation Time Frames Data Memory
Fluhrer-Lucks [13] - 2
73 - 2
43 2
51
Fluhrer [14] 2
80 2
65 2 2
12:4 2
80
Goli c et al. [16] 2
80 2
70 45 2
17 2
80
Lu-Vaudenay [24] - 2
40 2
35 2
39:6 2
35
Our basic 2
38 2
38 2
26:5 2
31:1 2
33
Attacks advanced 2
38 2
38 2
23:8 2
28:4 2
33
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have generalized the concept of conditional correlations in [1,21,
22] to study conditional correlation attacks against stream ciphers and other cryp-
tosystems, in case the computation of the output allows for side information related
to correlations conditioned on the input. A general framework has been developed
for smart distinguishers, which exploit those generalized conditional correlations. In
particular, based on the theory of the traditional distinguisher [5] we derive the num-
ber of samples necessary for a smart distinguisher to succeed. It is demonstrated
that the generalized conditional correlation is no smaller than the unconditional
correlation. Consequently, the smart distinguisher improves on the traditional basic
distinguisher (in the worst case the smart distinguisher degrades into the traditional
one); the smart distinguisher could be ecient even if no ordinary correlations exist.
As an application of our generalized conditional correlations, a conditional correla-
tion attack on the two-level Bluetooth E0 is developed and optimized. Whereas the
analysis in [24] was based on a traditional distinguishing attack using the strongest
(unconditional) 5-bit correlation, we have successfully demonstrated the superiority
of our attack over [24] by showing a best attack using 4-bit conditional correla-
tions, which are not suitable for the attack in [24] as the corresponding ordinary
correlations are all zeros. Our best attack fully recovers the original encryption key
using the rst 24 bits of 223:8 frames and with 238 computations. Compared with
all existing attacks [13,14,16,20,24,29], this is clearly the fastest and only prac-
tical known-plaintext attack on Bluetooth encryption so far. It remains to be an
interesting challenge to investigate the redundancy in the header of each frame for
a practical ciphertext-only attack on Bluetooth encryption.
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Appendix
Proof for E[(fB)]  (f)
By Eq.(7), we have
E[(fB)] = 2r X
A2GF(2)r
E
"
DfB(A)  
1
2r
2#
; (22)
where the expectation is taken over uniformly distributed B for the xed A. On the
other hand, since Df(A) = E[DfB(A)] for any xed A, we have
(f) = 2
r X
A2GF(2)r

Df(A)  
1
2r
2
(23)
= 2r X
A2GF(2)r

E[DfB(A)]  
1
2r
2
(24)
= 2
r X
A2GF(2)r
E
2

DfB(A)  
1
2r

; (25)
by denition of Eq.(1), with all the expectation taken over uniformly distributed B
for the xed A. As we know from theory of statistics that for any xed A,
0  Var

DfB(A)  
1
2r

= E
"
DfB(A)  
1
2r
2#
  E
2

DfB(A)  
1
2r

(26)
always holds, where equality holds i DfB(A) is independent of B. Approximation of Distribution of F

Bi(X i) for Wrong Keys
Firstly, with c K1 6= K1, the reason that we estimate F

Bi(X i) to be uniformly
and independently distributed for all i can be explained as follows for the cases21
when
Q4
j=1 (h

Bi
tj+1
) 6= 0. Assuming that Pi's are uniformly and independently dis-
tributed, we deduct by Eq.(12) that so are c Bi's for every b K, where c Bi = (\ Bi
t1+1;:::,
\ Bi
t4+1). Hence, we estimate g(\ Bi
tj+1) for j = 1;:::;4 are also uniformly and in-
dependently distributed, which allows to conclude by Eq.(16) that DF

Bi can be
approximated by a uniformly distributed sequence.
Secondly, in the remaining one case of wrong guess such that c K1 = K1 and
c K2 6= K2, F

Bi(X i) is no longer uniformly distributed; but it is more favourable to
us, because we have F

Bi(X i) = f

Bi(Xi)  1 for all i such that
Q4
j=1 (h

Bi
tj+1
) 6= 0,
whose distribution has larger Kullback-Leibler distance (see [11]) to Df

Bi than a
uniform distribution does according to [5].
In all, we can pessimistically approximate DF

Bi by a uniform distribution for
each wrong guess b K 6= K.
Advanced Application
Having studied how to apply Section 3 with r = 1 (namely the uni-bias-based
approach) for an attack to E0 in Section 6, we wonder the possibility of improve-
ment based on multi-biases in the same spirit as in [23], which are utilized by the
traditional distinguisher.
For the reason of low time complexity of the attack, we still focus on analysis of
4-bit biases; additionally, we restrict ourselves to bi-biases analysis (i.e. r = 2) to
simplify the presentation, which will be shown later to be optimal. Let   = (1;2),
where 1 is xed to (1;1;0;1) and 2 with length `2
def = j2j = 4 remains to be
determined later such that the data complexity is lowered when we analyze the
characteristics of bi-biases simultaneously for each frame instead of conducting the
previous uni-bias-based analysis.
Recall that g1(B) : GF(2)8 ! GF(2) in Section 6 was dened to be the most
likely bit of h
1
B (X) for a uniformly distributed X 2 GF(2)4 if it exists (i.e. (h

B) 6=
0). We extend g1(B) : GF(2)8 ! GF(2) to g (B) : GF(2)8 ! GF(2)2 over all
B 2 GF(2)8 such that (h
1
B ) 6= 0, and let g (B) be the most likely 2-bit binary
vector  = (1;2). Note that we can always easily determine the rst bit 1 because
of the assumption (h
1
B ) 6= 0; with regards to determining the second bit 2 in case
that a tie occurs, we just let 2 be a uniformly distributed bit. Let
h 
B(X) = (h
1
B (X);h
2
B (X)); (27)
h
  (B;X) = (h 1(B;X);h 2(B;X)): (28)
Note that h 
B(X) outputs the two bits which are generated by the same unknown
X given B; by contrast, h
  (B;X) outputs the two bits which are generated by the
unknown X and B. We can extend F
1
Bi(X i) in Eq.(16) to F 
Bi(X i) by letting
F 
Bi(X i)
=
0
@
4 M
j=1
h
1
Bi
tj+1
(Xi
tj+1)  h  1(Bi
t0+1;Xi
t0+1);
4 M
j=1
h
2
Bi
tj+1
(Xi
tj+1)  h  2(Bi
t0+1;Xi
t0+1)
1
A
g (\ Bi
tj+1); (29)
21 By denition of F

Bi, this is trivial for the cases when
Q4
j=1 (h

Bi
tj+1
) = 0.if
Q4
j=1 (h
1
\ Bi
tj+1
) 6= 0; otherwise, we let it be a uniformly distributed two-bit vector.
Similarly, we denote F 
Bi(X i) corresponding to the correct guess by f 
Bi.
It's easy to verify the assumption holds to apply Section 3 that says DF 
Bican
still be approximated by a uniform distribution for each wrong guess on the key
b K 6= K. Moreover, by introducing the extended f
0 
Bi from f
01
Bi in Eq.(19) as
f
0 
Bi (X i)
def = (f
01
Bi (X i);f
02
Bi (X i)) (30)
=
0
@
4 M
j=1
h
1
Bi
tj+1
(X
i
tj+1)  h
 1(B
i
t0+1;X
i
t0+1);
4 M
j=1
h
2
Bi
tj+1
(Xi
tj+1)  h 2(Bi
t0+1;Xi
t0+1)
1
A:
Theorem 5 can be extended to the generalized theorem below
Theorem 6. For all Bi = (Bi
t1+1;Bi
t2+1;Bi
t3+1;Bi
t4+1) 2 GF(2)32, we always have
(f 
Bi) = (f
0 
Bi ):
Similar computation yields the same formula for data complexity we need as in
Eq.(20)
4Llog2
n
= (h
  )  E
4
h


h 
Bt+1
i
: (31)
Experimental result shows that with 1 = (1;1;0;1);2 = (1;0;1;1), we achieve
optimum (h 
Bt+1)  2 2:415 (in comparison to (h
1
Bt+1) = 2 3 previously), though
(h
  ) always equals (h  1) regardless of the choice of 2; additionally, (h
  )  0
if 1;2 6= (1;1;0;1). Therefore, we have the minimum data complexity n  223:8
frames. And the time complexity remains the same according to Theorem 1 in
Section 3.
Equivalent Keys
Recall that in Subsection 6.1 we have the 33-bit key K = (K1;K2), with K1 =
(Gt1(K);:::;Gt4(K)). For simplicity, we let K1;i = Gti(K). Dene the following 8-bit
masks (in hexadecimal):
mask0 = 0x00; mask1 = 0xff; mask2 = 0x0f; mask3 = 0xf0:
Then for any K, we can replace K1;i by K1;i  maskj for any i = 1;2;:::;4 and
j 2 f0;1;2;3g and replace K2 by K2  d
j
2e. Denote this set containing 44 = 28
elements by hKi. We can easily verify that the Walsh coecients c H00 of the element
in the set equals by following the denition of convolution between H and H0:
H 
 H
0(K) =
X
K0
H(K
0)H
0(K  K
0): (32)
Since if R 2 hKi then RK0 2 hK K0i for all K0. And H0 maps all the elements
of the same set to the same value from Section 6, we conclude the set dened above
form an equivalent class of the candidate keys. Thus, we have 28 equivalent 33-bit
keys.